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Current Developments in Depreciation
BY RUDOLPH J. ENGLERT

Partner, Cincinnati Office
Presented before Columbus Chapter of The Ohio Society
of Certified Public Accountants and before the University of Dayton Tax Institute, Dayton — December 1960
R E C E N T COURT DECISIONS
BACKGROUND

Shortly after the enactment of the 1954 Code, considerable publicity was given in tax publications, newspapers, and elsewhere to an
alleged loophole in the then new depreciation allowances. A n example
was given of a man earning $100,000 a year who pays $4,600 for a car
for use in his business. It was then demonstrated that after using this
car for a year and selling it for $1,200 less than he paid for it, the man
made a net-after-tax cash profit of $525. Using the double-declining
balance method of depreciation he takes a deduction of $2,300 (based
on a four-year useful life). This reduced his taxes $2,000 since he was
in the 87% bracket. He paid $275 capital gains tax on the sale of the
car (25% of $1,100). Thus, the net reduction in his tax was $1,725.
After subtracting the $1,200 cash loss on the sale of the car he had
$575 more cash in his pocket than he had before he bought the car.
This idea was quite appealing to the many taxpayers who owned
property subject to depreciation allowances, particularly those who
usually sold their property before it reached the end of its physical life.
There were others, however, who didn't appreciate this state of affairs.
I assume they were the people who didn't use their automobiles in
their work. In any event, one congressman was so distressed about
the situation that he wrote to the Treasury Department. M r . Laurens
Williams, Assistant to the Secretary of the Treasury, replied to the
congressman and the congressman placed the reply in the Congressional Record of June 16, 1955.
This recitation of an incident occurring in 1955 undoubtedly seems
out of place in a 1960 discussion of current developments. However,
Mr. Williams' letter contained the first official statements by the
Treasury Department as to the meaning it would attribute to the concepts of "salvage value" and "useful life." His letter represents the
commencement of a controversy which lasted five years and just
terminated in June 1960.
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Mr. Williams asserted that the statements publicizing this tax
scheme were based on several wholly fallacious assumptions:
First, he said they ignore salvage value. Moreover, he said, a
realistic salvage value must be used. Consideration must be
given to the taxpayer's use of the property, the retirement and
maintenance practice he follows, and the salvage or other
proceeds he realizes on disposition of the property. Where a
taxpayer's practice is to dispose of depreciable property substantially before the end of its full physical life, the realistic
salvage value will be the amount which probably will be realized
at the time of disposition. Thus, in the example given, depreciation would be allowable only on the difference between the car's
cost ($4,600) and its salvage value ($3,400).
Secondly, he stated the allowable rate of depreciation is dependent
on the useful life of the property. "Useful life" for this purpose
is not the full physical life normally inherent in the property.
Rather it is the useful life of the property determined in accordance with the practice of the particular taxpayer in his
trade or business. Thus, in the example given, since the taxpayer used the property for but one year, his depreciation rate is
100%—the full difference between the cost and salvage value.
Third, since the accelerated depreciation methods allowable under
the 1954 Code apply only "in the case of property with a useful
life of three years or more," the taxpayer in the example given
could not use the declining-balance method.
This obviously was not a casual letter dashed off hurriedly by a
representative of the Treasury Department to placate an irate congressman. It seems more likely that a considerable amount of time
was spent by some very talented people in studying this entire problem. It would be interesting to know whether the Treasury Department had already formulated its ideas on this subject prior to the
widespread publicity of this alleged loophole. In any event, the same
ideas expressed in Mr. Williams' letter were substantially incorporated
in the proposed depreciation regulations issued in November 1955 and
were carried on into the final regulations.
The phrase "useful life" had never been used in the 1939 Code or
prior revenue acts. It first appeared in Section 167 (c) of the 1954 Code
which limits the use of the accelerated methods to property "with a
useful life of three years or more." For many years prior to the enact255

ment of the 1954 Code, the Government had consistently taken the
position that useful life meant economic or physical life. After the
enactment of the 1954 Code, however, the Government found it preferable to contend that "useful life" meant life in the taxpayer's business because it could then prevent the use of the accelerated methods
on assets that are turned over within three years.
While this concept of useful life would prevent the use of the
accelerated methods by many taxpayers, the Government had to be
careful that its arguments wouldn't backfire. The shortening of the
useful life standing alone obviously increases the depreciation rate.
Therefore, if the depreciation deduction was to be minimized the depreciable base had to be reduced by increasing the salvage value. The
regulations had always viewed the depreciable base as original cost
minus salvage value. Prior to the 1954 Code, salvage value was usually
taken to mean the scrap or the junk value left in the asset when its
usefulness was gone. However, since the Commissioner was now
taking the position that useful life of an asset is the taxpayer's holding
period, he found it necessary to define salvage value as the amount
that will be realizable on sale or other disposition of an asset when it is
no longer useful in the taxpayer's business.
SUPREME COURT—MASSEY MOTORS, INC., ET AL.

This radical change of definitions by the Treasury Department
was bound to arouse the ire of some red-blooded American taxpayers.
Massey Motors, Inc., Robley and Julia Evans, and The Hertz Corporation, fought the good fight to the finish. However, the Supreme
Court ruled against them in June 1960 and business must now accept
and live with these rules:
(1) "Useful life" means the period over which the asset may
reasonably be expected to be useful to the taxpayer in his
trade or business, and not the period of the physical or economic life of the asset.
(2) "Salvage value" is saleable value and must be related to the
useful life of the asset in the taxpayer's business.
(3) While double-declining balance depreciation is computed
without reference to salvage value, no further depreciation
deductions are allowed after such deductions have reduced
the basis of the property to its salvage value.
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The taxpayers had this much solace. They at least learned that
they weren't entirely dreaming when they had the feeling that the
Commissioner had changed the rules on them. Four justices dissenting in the Massey and Evans cases stated that the "Commissioner's
pre-1956 position on useful life was flatly opposed to that which he
now takes." They said, "This is one of those situations where what
may be thought to be an appealing practical position on the part of
the Government, has obscured the weakness of its legal position."
However, the battle is over and we must live with and abide by the
new rules. What will be the effect of these rules on depreciation
practices?
E F F E C T S

O F S U P R E M E

COURT

DECISIONS

(1) Generally, a business will be denied the use of accelerated
depreciation on a newly purchased asset if the asset is of
a type that the company in the past usually sold or traded
in less than three years. However, if the company can establish that it intends to break with this past practice, the
Treasury Department should permit the accelerated method.
(2) Even though an asset will definitely have a physical life
exceeding six years, the taxpayer must decide that he intends
to keep it over six years before he is entitled to elect the
first-year additional 20% depreciation.
(3) A taxpayer must stop claiming depreciation under the declining-balance method when the basis of the property is reduced
to its salvage value. The statement of this proposition standing alone could be misleading. We should be quick to add
that salvage value, as defined in the regulations, "is the
amount (determined at the time of acquisition) which is estimated will be realizable upon sale or other disposition of an
asset when it is no longer useful in the taxpayer's . . . business." Thus, when it is said that depreciation deductions must
stop when the basis of the property is reduced to its salvage
value, we are speaking of the value at the time the asset is
no longer useful in the taxpayer's business. Consequently,
it is quite possible that under the declining-balance method,
the depreciated cost of an asset may be less than its market
value at a date prior to the end of the taxpayer's holding
period. The depreciation deduction in that year would not
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be limited so long as the basis of the asset, after deducting
the current year's depreciation, will not be less than the
amount which will be realizable when it is no longer useful
in the taxpayer's business.
So much for the situation when depreciated cost is less than
market at a date prior to the end of the taxpayer's holding period.
But what about the situation where a taxpayer disposes of an asset
at an earlier date than the one anticipated when he acquired the
asset? For example, let's assume that a taxpayer purchased an
asset on January 1, 1956 for $10,000. A t that time, he intended to
keep the asset for ten years and estimated the salvage value at the
end of ten years to be $2,000. He elected to use double-declining
balance depreciation. In the five-year period from January 1, 1956
to December 31, 1960 he claims $6,723 depreciation. The depreciated
value at December 31, 1960 is then $3,277. The depreciation deduction for 1960 is $819. Now let's assume that he sells this asset on
December 31, 1960 for $6,000. Let's further assume the Revenue
Agent appears on the scene in February 1961 to examine all open
years and reviews the depreciation claimed on this asset.
The Agent might contend first that the taxpayer was not allowed
to depreciate the asset below $6,000. Since $3,600 was claimed in the
years 1956 and 1957, this would mean that only $400 depreciation
would be allowable in 1958 and no deduction allowed in 1959 and
1960.
In order to sustain this contention it would seem that it must be
established (1) that the asset might reasonably have been expected
to be useful to the taxpayer for only a five-year period, and (2) at the
time of acquisition, it was reasonable to assume that $6,000 would be
realized on the sale of the asset after the five-year holding period.
However, under our set of facts, you will recall that our taxpayer
at the time he bought this asset intended to keep it for ten years.
If he can show that it has been his practice to hold this type of asset
for ten years he probably won't have much trouble in having the
ten-year life accepted. On the other hand, if he hadn't purchased
this type of asset before, he may have some difficulty in getting the
Treasury Department to believe that it was his intention to hold it
for ten years in view of the fact that he sold the asset after five years.
He will then be faced with the necessity of showing what particular
circumstance or set of circumstances caused him to change his mind.
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Let's assume that the taxpayer satisfies the Agent that at the
time he acquired this asset he honestly intended to hold it for ten
years. The Agent's second contention might then be that no depreciation should be allowed for the calendar year 1960. This contention
would be based on the following provisions of the regulations:
R E G . 1.167 (a)-1(b) ". . . The estimated useful life may be subject
to modification by reason of conditions known to exist at the end of
the taxable year and shall be redetermined when necessary regardless
of the method of computing depreciation. However, estimated remaining useful life shall be redetermined only when the change in the
useful life is significant and there is a clear and convincing basis for
the determination."
R E G . 1.167(a)-1(c) ". . . Salvage value shall not be changed at
any time after the determination made at the time of acquisition merely
because of changes in price levels. However, if there is a redetermination of useful life under the rules of paragraph (b) of this section,
salvage value may be redetermined based upon facts known at the
time of such redetermination of useful life."
The Agent states that the change in the life of the asset in the
taxpayer's hands from the originally estimated ten years to the actual
holding period of five years was significant; and what clearer and
more convincing basis for redetermining the useful life can there be
than the fact that the taxpayer disposed of the asset after five years.
Since there can be a redetermination of useful life, the regulations
state that salvage value may be redetermined based on facts known
at the time of such redetermination. The fact is that the taxpayer
sold the asset for $6,000. Since the asset was already depreciated
down to $4,096 at January 1, 1960 and the redetermined salvage value
is $6,000, he concludes that under the Treasury rules no depreciation
is allowable for 1960.
There may be difficulties in overcoming this line of reasoning.
Some encouragement can be obtained from a statement by Justice
Harlan in his dissent in the Massey Motors case. He said, "In examining the cases, it must be borne in mind that even the Commissioner
does not contend that a taxpayer who happens to dispose of some
asset before its physical exhaustion must depreciate it on a useful
life equal to the time it was actually held. It is only when the asset
may reasonably be expected to be disposed of prior to the end of its
physical life that a taxpayer must base depreciation on the shorter
period."
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C O H N

DECISION

In the Cohn case, decided by the Court of Appeals for the Sixth
Circuit in 1958, the Court held that since the actual amounts that
had been received on sale of the equipment exceeded the remaining
undepreciated basis of the assets, no depreciation was allowable in
the taxable year ending after such sale. The Court reached this result
by holding the salvage value could be adjusted at or near the end
of the useful life of the asset when it is shown by an actual sale of
the asset that there is a substantial difference between what was
estimated and what it actually is.
There is one point of distinction between the facts in the Cohn
case and the hypothetical situation we are considering here. In the
Cohn case the taxpayer sold its assets near the end of the useful life
it had originally estimated. The Court accepted this useful life used
by the taxpayer. It did not change the useful life. This should be kept in
mind when the Court said, "Insofar as this case is concerned the issue
is whether salvage value can be adjusted at or near the end of the
useful life of the asset when it is shown by an actual sale of the asset
that there is a substantial difference between what was estimated and
what it actually is." It is quite possible that this same Court might
have ruled differently if it had been considering our situation in which
our taxpayer planned to keep the asset for ten years at the time he
bought it but by reason of some unforeseen circumstance decided to
sell it after five years. There would be nothing wrong with the 1960
depreciation claimed by our taxpayer if he held the asset beyond 1960.
Why should the depreciation be different if the asset is sold at the end
of 1960? We all know the one big reason why the Commissioner
wants it to be different, and that is because of the benefit that the
taxpayer gets under Section 1231. Congress certainly had some good
reason in mind when it placed Section 1231 and its predecessor, Section 117(j), in the Code. If the introduction of the accelerated depreciation methods in 1954 permits the taxpayers to obtain more of a
break under Section 1231 than Congress realized would be obtained,
it seems to me that it is up to Congress to amend Section 1231 or
Section 167 or both. A s indicated earlier, however, it may be difficult
to overcome the Agent's proposal to disallow the 1960 depreciation on
the assets sold in 1960. But, if the Commissioner intends to follow
this line of reasoning, taxpayers should be allowed to follow it too.
Let's consider this situation.
260

Suppose a corporation sells a piece of improved real estate and
two machines on December 31, 1960. Using conventional accounting
procedures, its books show: A gain of $172,000 on the sale of real
estate after claiming $2,000 depreciation on improvements in 1960; a
gain of $7,500 on the sale of machine " A " , after claiming $2,500 depreciation in 1960; and a loss of $17,500 on the sale of machine " B "
after claiming $2,500 depreciation in 1960.
But now we want to adjust the books to follow the same line
of reasoning that the Agent followed in our other hypothetical situation. We should, therefore, eliminate the $2,000 depreciation claimed
in 1960 on the real estate improvements and reduce the gain on the
sale of the real estate by $2,000. We should eliminate the $2,500
depreciation claimed in 1960 on machine " A " and reduce the gain
on its sale by $2,500. For both the real estate and machine " A " , we
adjusted the salvage value to the selling price of the property for the
purpose of computing depreciation in the year of sale. Since both
the real estate and machine " A " were sold for more than their adjusted
bases at the beginning of the year of sale, depreciation during the year
of sale is disallowed entirely. Now, applying the same line of reasoning to machine " B " , we must adjust its salvage value downward. B y
adjusting the salvage value to the actual amount realized on the sale
and by adjusting the useful life to terminate in the year of sale, we
find that we must increase the 1960 depreciation on machine " B " by
$17,500. This, of course, wipes out the $17,500 loss that had been previously recorded. The net effect of these adjustments is to increase the
depreciation deduction by $13,000 and increase the Section 1231 gain
by $13,000. In the case of a corporation with taxable income in excess
of $25,000, this would reduce the tax by $3,510 (27% of $13,000).
P O R T L A N D

G E N E R A L

ELECTRIC

C O M P A N Y

CASE

The new rules on useful life established by the Commissioner and
upheld by the Supreme Court will not always work to the advantage
of the Commissioner. The case of Portland General Electric Company,
decided by a district court in Oregon on September 26, 1960, is
an interesting one if for no other reason than the fact that it was
decided for the taxpayer, and the Commissioner was required to
refund over one and one-half million dollars tax that he had previously collected from the taxpayer by adjusting his depreciation. But,
its main element of interest, I believe, lies in the fact that the Court
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cites the Massey case in support of its decision to accept the taxpayer's
depreciation methods. The facts were somewhat involved and I won't
attempt to discuss all the elements of the case. The interesting aspect
relevant to our discussion at this point is this: The original deficiency
was based on the findings of an engineering agent. A t the trial this
agent admitted that he used "assigned lives," his "experience elsewhere" and "what I have known elsewhere." In days gone by, the
testimony of an expert witness such as an engineering agent as to his
experience elsewhere would have carried great weight in the determination of the useful life of depreciable assets. But today the rule
as written by the Treasury Department and approved by the Supreme
Court in Massey et al., is that the useful life of depreciable property is
to be measured by the experience of the business in which it is used.
The Court said, "The Commissioner overlooks the actual experience
had by Portland General Electric and substituted information substantially gained from extrinsic experience and evidence."
OTHER DEVELOPMENTS

I have devoted a good portion of my allotted time to a discussion
of the new concepts of useful life and salvage value. This I believe is
the real significant current development in the area of depreciation.
Although the controversy concerning these definitions has now been
resolved, it seems to me that more problems have been created than
were solved. I attempted to indicate a few of the problems. Time
will not permit a discussion of others; and I am sure that additional
problems, which we do not even recognize at this time, will arise in
the future. One of the main difficulties will stem from the fact that
the Treasury Department must evaluate the subjective position of
each taxpayer with respect to the property he owns before it can
formulate an opinion about whether the taxpayer's depreciation is
computed correctly.
Let's now turn to several other developments of the past year
with respect to depreciation.
" N E W

I N

U S E "

T E S T — R U L I N G

In February 1960 the Internal Revenue Service issued a ruling
which held that "if a taxpayer as the original purchaser and user
acquires and occupies a personal residence after December 31, 1953,
and subsequently converts it to rental property, then the rental prop262

erty meets the 'new in use' test and the taxpayer may use an accelerated depreciation method."
This, of course, isn't a development of any earth-shaking significance since there aren't a great number of taxpayers converting their
residences to rental property. But I do believe it is an interesting
ruling and it focuses our attention on the requirements of Section
167 (c) which states that the accelerated depreciation methods shall
apply only in the case of property acquired after 1953 "if the original
use of such property commences with the taxpayer and commences
after such date."
Even though the taxpayer concerned in this ruling had first used
the property as a residence he was allowed the benefit of accelerated
depreciation when he changed his use of the property by converting
it to rental property. The Service held that since the property was
not previously used by another party and since this is the first taxable
year in which the property may be subject to depreciation allowances
by the taxpayer, the "new in use" test is met.
This brings to mind the reverse situation—a situation where contrary to one's first impression the "new in use" test is probably not
met. Suppose a taxpayer has new equipment installed under a lease
arrangement and several months later decides to buy the equipment.
The taxpayer started the physical use of the equipment and it was
new when he received it. One might conclude that accelerated depreciation would therefore be available. However, bear in mind that the
first business use of the leased equipment was for the production of
rental income by the lessor. Accordingly, when the lessee purchases
the property he is the second instead of the first user and it seems
that he would not be permitted to use accelerated depreciation.
E F F E C T

O F

CARRYOVER

PROVISIONS

There are certain exceptions to the requirement that the taxpayer must be the original user of the property. Where ownership
changes hands in certain tax-free transactions, Section 381 (c) (6)
permits the transferee corporation to step into the transferor corporation's shoes and continue the accelerated methods where they
have been applied by the transferor. However, we should be careful
to note that Section 381 (c) (6) applies only to the transactions specified in Section 381 (a). Thus, carryovers are not specifically provided
for in the following cases where the assets received do not retain the
263

same basis they had in the hands of the corporation making the
distribution:
(1) A partial liquidation under Section 346.
(2) A liquidation of a subsidiary corporation where the amount
paid for its stock becomes the basis of the assets in the
hands of the parent corporation by reason of Section 334
(b) (2)—the so-called Kimble-Diamond rule.
There are also situations where the basis of the assets transferred
carries over to the transferee corporation, but Section 381 does not
call for the carryover of the method of computing depreciation. For
example, Section 381 does not provide for carryovers in the case of
split-ups, split-offs, and spin-offs, that is, divisive reorganizations to
which Section 368 (a)(1)(D), and 355 or 356 of the Code apply.
Likewise, Section 381 does not apply to transfers of property owned
by individuals or partnerships in tax-free incorporations under Section 351.
R E G U L A T I O N S

U N D E R

SECTION

179

The Treasury Department published the final regulations with
respect to the additional first-year depreciation allowances on December 2, 1960. These regulations prescribe the type of statement that
must be filed with the return in order properly to elect the additional
allowance. The statement is essentially the same as that prescribed
in the temporary rules published by the Treasury Department in
November 1958. However, the regulations place added emphasis on
the necessity for filing this statement. They say, "Except as provided in paragraph (d) (1) of this section, an election will not be valid
unless the statement is submitted at the time and in the manner
prescribed herein." Paragraph (d)(1) then provides that if the taxpayer has claimed the additional allowance but failed to attach the
required statement to his return, he may cure this deficiency by filing
the required statement within 90 days after the final regulations are
published in the Federal Register.
The regulations also state that the taxpayer will be allowed to
revoke his election or to change his previous selection of property
subject to the additional allowance within 90 days after the proposals
are final. In order to do this he must submit a statement showing
the new selection of property or that the election is being revoked;
and amended returns must be filed.
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As you know, the Code permits the additional allowance only
on Section 179 property. One of the essential elements of Section 179
property is the requirement that it be tangible personal property. As
we in Ohio know, the question of what is and what is not personal
property is not a simple one. Elaborate structures firmly affixed to
the ground or attached to a building, which in other states would be
considered as real estate, are often taxed in Ohio as personal property.
Apparently, the Treasury Department will not concern itself with
our local quarrels or the determinations that have been made by our
local tax assessors. It will use its own rules. The regulations state
that "Local law definitions will not be controlling for purposes of determining the term tangible personal property." Included in the
examples given in the regulations of items not considered personal
property are: wiring in a building, plumbing systems, pipes, ducts, or
other items that are structural components of a building or other
structure.
If any of the foregoing items serves a purpose peculiar to the
nature of the business conducted on the premises, it is probable that
the Ohio Department of Taxation will assess it as personal property.
However, unless the taxpayer likes to argue with the Treasury Department, he will be well advised to select an item not in this category
when electing the first-year additional depreciation allowance.
S U R V E Y

O F DEPRECIATION

PRACTICES

Last summer the Treasury Department undertook a survey of
depreciation methods and practices and of average useful lives of
property. It sent a comprehensive questionnaire to about 3,000 large
corporations, which claim approximately two-thirds of all corporate
depreciation deductions. The Small Business Administration sent the
same questionnaire to about 8,500 small businesses, that is, firms
employing between 50 and and 250 people.
The questionnaire elicited opinions on whether the companies
were satisfied with current depreciation allowances; and if not, why?
If they weren't satisfied, they were asked which of various changes
they would like to see made, such as:
A n up-to-date Treasury Bulletin " F " as a depreciation guide.
Incorporation of rate schedules in the law, with the provision
that the taxpayer could take up to a specified per cent more
than the listed rates.
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Allowing faster early depreciation, such as a 300% decliningbalance method.
Extension of the 20% first-year depreciation to more assets.
Letting depreciation deductions reflect increases in replacement
price levels.
The companies were also asked if in order to obtain any one or more
of these changes they would be willing (1) to use the same method for
both tax and accounting purposes, and (2) to pay ordinary income tax
rather than capital gain tax on any profits from selling depreciated
property.
In addition to completing the questionnaire, the 3,000 larger corporations were asked to prepare certain schedules. These schedules
asked for details on the amounts invested in depreciable property,
methods of depreciation, and so forth.
This research project was the result of mounting pressure from
various groups of taxpayers, many of whom have had representatives
appearing before congressional committees urging a wide variety of
depreciation reform measures. The Treasury Department felt that it
couldn't evaluate the various proposals without more statistical information on current depreciation practice.
A t the time this project was undertaken, the Chairman of the
Joint Committee on Internal Revenue Taxation announced his Committee's interest in this survey. He said that if the firms polled "would
give full and prompt participation in the survey, it would greatly add
to its reliability and usefulness in providing a sound basis for making
revisions in the depreciation laws." The fruits of this survey should be
available for congressional study early in 1961. It therefore appears
that we may have grounds for hoping that serious attention will soon
be given to some liberalization of depreciation allowances.
DEPRECIATION

POLICY

In a recent address, M r . David A . Lindsay, General Counsel of
the Treasury Department, indicated that the Treasury Department
believes that any liberalization of depreciation allowances should carry
with it an additional change in the law to the effect that income from
the sale of depreciable property should be treated as ordinary income
to the extent of depreciation deductions taken on the property. Such
a change, he stated, "would discourage attempts to claim excessive
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depreciation in order to create capital gains on disposal of overdepreciated property." On the other hand it could "make it possible for
revenue agents to accept more readily business judgments as to the
useful life and salvage value of depreciable property."
W e must admit that if excessive depreciation has been claimed on
an asset, permitting the taxpayer to pay only a capital gains tax on the
entire income from its sale might constitute a windfall to him. However, it should be recognized that the mere fact that a piece of equipment has been sold at a profit does not necessarily indicate that it has
been overdepreciated. Except in a few unusual situations, it has been
my experience that the gain on the sale stems from the fact, not that
excessive depreciation has been claimed, but that the market value has
increased—that there has been an increase in the reconstruction price—
new—in other words, from inflation. Is it fair or equitable to extract
a full tax on such a gain, or any tax, for that matter, particularly when
the company has to turn around and pay double or triple the original
price of the equipment disposed of for the replacement equipment?
The whole depreciation problem is not so simple that the key to its
solution lies in eliminating Section 1231 from the law.
The Federal tax depreciation policy that is adopted will play a
tremendously important part in the expansion or stagnation of our
economy. The Senate Select Committee on Small Business made a
study of the problem and concluded that "present depreciation policies
do not sufficiently encourage the expansion of the national economy.
Indeed, those policies have, in all probability, stifled economic
growth." The Committee then recommended congressional review of
all practical proposals for (1) shortening the period for depreciating
property, (2) permitting greater depreciation in the years immediately
after purchase of property, and (3) depreciating property on a basis
other than historic cost. Items (1) and (2), in my opinion, are merely
temporary measures and in no way cope with the long-term problem,
without item (3).
In advocating the allowance of depreciation on the basis of replacement value rather than through an extension of the accelerated
depreciation theory, M r . Logan T. Johnston, President of Armco Steel
Corporation, presented a very strong case at the annual meeting of the
Ohio Society of C P A s last October. He said: "Depreciation allowances have a direct and profound effect on our ability to compete
abroad. W e are faced with foreign manufacturers who not only have
lower tax and wage rates, but who are also able to build their plants at
267

lower cost and then write them off much faster than we can." He
pointed out that "in major industry, at least, most foreign plants are
already quite as modern as American plants and in many cases they
are superior." "One of the main difficulties," he said, "is that our depreciation allowances do not compensate for inflation. Recent estimates
indicate that cost of replacement is outrunning depreciation allowances
in American industry by six to eight billion dollars a year." He quoted
Professor William Paton of Michigan in estimating that "the total cost
of capital replacement since World W a r II not covered by depreciation
is between forty and fifty billion dollars." He predicted that American
business will "be confronted with demands for more funds than can
be generated by the business or reasonably secured in other ways."
This means that it simply cannot afford to modernize fast enough to
keep pace with foreign competition and at the same time maintain a
fair rate of return to the owners of the business. It is therefore of utmost importance that the handicaps retarding our participation in
world markets be dealt with intelligently.
W e as accountants and as tax practitioners should devote serious
study to this problem. B y developing workable solutions, we can make
a noteworthy contribution to the welfare of our country, and in so
doing can add immeasurably to the stature of our profession.
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